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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the Husserlian notion of “passive synthesis” can make a substantial contribution to 
the understanding of aesthetic experience. The argument is based on two empirical cases of qualitative 
interview material obtained from museum visitors and a world-renowned string quartet, which show that 
aesthetic experience contains an irreducible dimension of passive undergoing and surprise. Analyzing this 
material through the lens of passive syntheses, helps explain these experiences as well as the sense of 
subject-object fusion that occurs in some of the most intense forms of aesthetic experience. These analyses 
are then contrasted with a potentially contradicting take on aesthetic experience from a recent trend in 
cognitive science, namely enactive aesthetics, which insists on the active subjective construction and sense-
making of aesthetic experience. Finally we show that the two positions are in fact compatible. 
Keywords: Husserlian phenomenology, passive synthesis, enactive aesthetics, artworks in museums, 
musical absorption. 
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Introductioni 
 
In this paper, we demonstrate how an important element in Husserl’s thinking on subjectivity, namely his 
work on “passive synthesis” or just “passivity” is central for a phenomenological theory of aesthetic 
experience. Passive syntheses designate a substratum of subjectivity upon which “egoic” acts such as 
willing, choosing and deciding rest. We argue that such syntheses are at the heart of intense aesthetic 
experience and help to explain the experience of being moved or carried away, as well as the putative 
experiences of subject-object fusion. Husserl is not known as an important thinker of aesthetics, his main 
contribution in this field being on “image consciousness” in Ideen I.ii Our argument, however, suggest a 
novel rapprochement between Husserlian scholarship and aesthetics. 
The argument rests on two empirical cases: qualitative interviews with museum visitors and expert 
musicians. From museum visitors, we are focusing on descriptions of intense and memorable experiences 
with art within a greater framework of understanding the role of pre-reflective self-awareness in aesthetic 
experience. For the musicians, also within a greater framework of describing the overall phenomenology of 
musical absorption, we in this paper, focus on performing and undergoing experiences of feeling that the 
music is unfolding on its own as well as the rare and intense experiences of radical transformations of self-
awareness sensed as either a kind of black-out or hyper-presence. We then present the Husserlian 
explication of passive synthesis to demonstrate how it develops our understanding of the two cases. In 
particular, these analyses highlights the sense in which we are not only initiators, but also undergoers of 
experience and help explain how it is possible to feel that one is merging with an aesthetic object or even 
one’s surroundings, i.e. how a self-other blurring can manifest. These analyses are not merely meant to 
highlight Husserl’s potential for phenomenological aesthetics, but can also encompass theoretical advances 
in cognitive science, more particularly, enactive aesthetics, which stresses the active and explorative nature 
of perception in aesthetic experience.iii The enactive proposal stressing activity is prima facie at odds with 
the Husserlian emphasis on passivity. We show, however, that on the one hand, Husserl’s is a specific and 
technical term and, on the other hand, that the enactive usage is a response to computationalism in 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind. In other words, the notions of activity and passivity within the 
two traditions are not equivocal and hence it is not contradictory to claim that aesthetic experience can be 
both inherently passive (in the phenomenological sense) and inherently active (in the enactive sense).  
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1. The phenomenology of aesthetic and artistic experience 
 
Before beginning, let us delineate the scope of our argument. We are not in the business of providing 
necessary and sufficient conditions of aesthetic experience. In fact, we have no prior or special 
commitment to aesthetic experience as a bounded phenomenon. For the purposes of the present paper, 
employing this term is a pragmatic choice: people say that they have stimulating, memorable and 
meaningful experiences with seeing paintings, listening to or performing music. Whatever it is that makes it 
so, in the context of art exposure, we call aesthetic experience.iv 
The material about experience with visual art is generated in accordance with the methodology of 
phenomenological psychology as set forth by Giorgiv  while those of the experience of music performance 
are generated with methods from ethnography as prescribed primarily by Ravn,vi but also inspired by 
Gallagher’s “front loaded phenomenology”vii and Petitmengin’s “microphenomenology”.viii One is justified 
in doubting the epistemic integrity of the interdisciplinary endeavor of phenomenologically informed 
qualitative interviews. Such doubt potantially targets a number of complex problems pertaining primarily to 
epistemology and methodology each of which deserves detailed and direct responses. We have provided 
such elsewhere, defending the claim that interview-based analyses, when employed in a methodologically 
rigorous way, can yield important insights, clarifications, and challenges useful for phenomenology.ix For 
the sake of the current argument, we will not rehearse this lengthy defense here. 
 
The first set of interviews were collected in regard to an ongoing research project on aesthetic experience 
with visual arts at Esbjerg Museum of Art as well as the National Art Gallery in Denmark. The following 
statements are examples of how museum visitors describe their intense experiences with art.x The 
anonymized examples are selected from about 45 hours of interviewing and exemplify what is common to 
many of the descriptions. When interviewing museum visitors about their experiences with works of art, 
they mention being affected in involuntary and bodily ways in the sense of having immediate bodily 
reactions to the works of art, be it “a bubble of happiness” in the chest, or a feeling of “repulsion” and 
“nausea”. They talk about memories that appear spontaneously, they talk about surprise, about 
experiencing something unknown, and about being led to follow what they perceive to be the artist’s 
intentions.  They also mention feelings of being overwhelmed, affected, and pulled into the picture. A 
visitor, Stefan, for instance, says that seeing the paintings by Andre Derain, is “shocking”, and affects him 
“violently.” He becomes “touched”, “dizzy”, and “short of breath”. The pictures overwhelm him, inducing 
astonishment and a sense of feeling vanquished. This vocabulary, repeated several times throughout the 
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interview, indicates that the artworks affect him in a way in which he has no say. He simply experiences 
what the work of art does to him. He had similar experiences with Amedeo Modigliani’s paintings: the 
experience was very “strong” and “violent”. This feeling of “violence” is physical – it affects his breathing 
and he can become dizzy. It is a “grand” encounter that “touches” him, as if the painting “hits him”. The 
feeling of intensity transitions into a feeling of tiredness when he leaves the exhibit. Somewhat differently, 
Siv explains how it is “overstimulating” to visit art museums. It is a “bombardment” of her senses, so 
intense that she usually prefers nature over art. Nevertheless, there are experiences with art that she really 
values. For instance, once visiting a sculpture garden with the works of Barbara Hepworth: she is in a 
pleasant mood and it is lovely day, and suddenly she comes across an abstract sculpture which affects her 
like “a bolt from the blue.” She feels overwhelmed, “touched”, and starts to cry. Embarrassed about crying 
in public she leaves the sculpture, but returns to it after a while. She cries again, but now it is not so 
surprising to her. It is still mysterious to her why she cries as it is not an easily defined emotion like 
happiness or sadness, but is an experience she remembers with gratitude.xi Stefan’s and Siv’s experiences 
share the feature of being strongly affected, they share an opening or receptivity that we shall find once 
again in the descriptions musicians give of their performances.  
 
As we move on the next set of interviews with the musicians, it might be objected that the experience of 
visiting a museum cannot be contained within the same category as that of performing as a professional 
musician. We are not arguing that these two activities are identical, even if we see no principled reason 
why one could not have an aesthetic experience of one’s own performance – an argument, which Barbara 
Montero advances in the context of being a dancer.xii Clearly it makes a difference whether one is merely 
enjoying someone else’s artistic creation or whether one is enjoying the creation, which happens to be the 
creation one is currently bringing about. However, it is interesting to note that remarkable experiences of 
these two activities share some structural similarities, which will be brought out in the subsequent analysis.  
The presence of such similarities suggest that it might ultimately be possible to construct a coherent 
phenomenology of aesthetic experience, but that is an argument to be made elsewhere. 
In this section, we rely on a set of phenomenological interviews with the Danish String Quartet (DSQ), a 
world-famous ensemble performing and recording the “classic” classical repertoire, such as Mozart and 
Beethoven, as well as Nordic folk music.xiii The following material is picked out from about 17 hours of 
interviewing, as relevant for the present argument and thus composes only a fragment of the material and 
ideas within it, conducted with the aim of understanding the overall phenomenology of musical 
absorption.xiv One of the main theoretical insights availed by the investigation with the DSQ is that musical 
absorption – although encompassing a multitude of intentionalities and mental states – can be grasped as a 
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coherent phenomenon when assessed from the central view point of a change in the sense of agency or 
the sense of passivity.xv The DSQ members have spent thousands of hours training their bodily and 
expressive skills. They do not need to focus intentionally on the movement of their fingers and arms 
(though they can and sometimes do) to make their bodies obey the commands of the music when 
performing. In other words, they have developed the ability to play in an automatic fashion or to let the 
body “play on its own”. It is from this fact of the intentionality of bodily expertise that our understanding of 
passivity must depart. 
The DSQ violinist Frederik Øland, when trying to describe the most usual way he experiences performing, 
says the following 
But you can perhaps say that what we’re striving for at a technical level, that is to be…that it is 
coming by itself and that you are not too aware of it, that you do not spend any energy on it, that 
you just have this that it is coming by itself, but that you are aware of it maintaining itself. 
Here Frederik does not attribute primary agency to himself, but relegates it to this automatic body, such 
that “you do not have to spend any energy”, or such that music “comes by itself” accompanied by an 
observational stance of awareness of “it maintaining itself”. The other violinist, Rune Tonsgaard mentions 
that: “you’re surprised about how much the fingers remember themselves. Let the fingers play. Just use the 
activity of the brain not on what you’re playing. Let go and think about something else.” The performance 
has to unfold on its own. The fingers, not even agentially mentioned as “my fingers” but as anonymous 
fingers, should be allowed to play on their own. This automaticity of the body and self-unfolding nature of 
the music played in this way allows the musician to direct his attention elsewhere, for instance mentally 
preparing for a difficult passage, engaging in mental imagery that changes the sounds or evoking certain 
emotions that enhance the cohesion of the ensembles’ sound. The sense of automaticity entails neither 
that the musicians do not know what they are doing, nor that they are not aware of the way the music 
unfolds, nor that they feel possessed or out of control. Rather, many active choices regarding 
interpretation, imagery, expression and so on are made.xvi But such choices can only be made when based 
on this skilled and flexible automaticity, which gives rise to the sense that the music is unfolding on its own. 
The automaticity involved in the sense of music unfolding grounds an affective dimension of performance: 
the experience of being moved by, or drawn into a piece of music necessarily depends on such skilled and 
habitual processes beyond the command of one’s will and intentions. 
After this general outline of musical absorption, let us turn to more specific experiences of more intense 
forms of absorption, where it becomes even clearer that the music unfolds in a way that transcends the 
musician’s immediate will or sense of choice, here from the DSQ cellist, Fredrik Sjölin  
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I think I have an idea of where I’m going and then I think…for each tone you play, you could say it 
such that time was a long, long line and you had a lot of points on the line….so for each point you 
advance, then…it gives…it will give the premise for where the next point would be because the 
tone itself in a sense defines the next tone and so on because otherwise the phrase becomes 
unnatural. And therefore you’re really in the tone you’re really on and then it kind of gives itself 
how the next tone will become…You need a smooth [development] and therefore each tone, each 
and every vibrato, each and every oscillation, bowing, phrasing, everything builds towards how it 
is going to become and it is impossible to predict how it will play out. It depends on what you laid 
as ground. 
 
Ok, but you…must, once you’ve practised it, know how it is going to play out? 
 
No. 
 
He adds that sometimes the DSQ surprise themselves for instance by playing in a different tempo than 
agreed on. They have been forced into this tempo and “cannot get out of it” at least if they want to stay 
faithful the musical impulse they are feeling. Experientially considered, the musician can be performing in 
this fashion because he is not the sole agent of the performance, which, in order not to “become 
unnatural”, must develop according to its own logicxvii and transcend and distribute the agency and activity 
of the individual musician. Theoretically considered, the musician retains full agency and control. He could, 
in principle, at any point choose to increase or decrease his tempo, play more loudly or stop altogether. But 
the DSQ members believe that doing so, imposing one’s will onto the music in this way, is not actually 
playing the music in the way it is supposed to be played and that they can sense if one of the others is 
trying to force the music in a certain direction. From the perspective of their experience, they cannot stop 
in the middle of a concert. They cannot remain adequately receptive to what they are supposed to be 
doing, if they do not allow themselves to be guided by this will or logic of the music.  
 
The experience of being led by the music can also induce a certain spatial reorientation by which the 
musician comes to see the performance at a distance, as if it is not himself playing. Here is Frederik Øland’s 
description: 
it is like…the feeling of looking over a large landscape and knowing that this landscape consists 
of insects and branches and roots and all kinds of things building up the whole thing, but you 
cannot see the individual parts, you just know that all of it is, contributes to the being and that 
you actually could affect the little things, but you don’t want to because you want everything to 
be there and contribute. 
Jazz musicians are also prone to this kind of experience. Jazz-violinist, Kristian Jørgensen, for instance, 
expresses that: 
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you find yourself so much at ease in the situation, that you, it is someone else playing for you and 
you yourself are sitting out in the, you sit and enjoy the music back down behind the mixer 
[referring to the recording studio, where the producer mixes the recorded sound] with your feet 
up out in the control room and then it is just like, you’ve let go. 
Surprisingly, Jørgensen is not here referring to mixing or producing someone else’s recording. He is 
referring to himself performing a concert, but feeling as if he is sitting behind the mixer with an 
externalized, third person perspective on himself. It is rare for this kind of experience to come so much to 
the experiential foregroundxviii that it causes such an altered spatial self-perspective. Should there be 
evidence for a full-blown musical out-of-body experience,xix we believe that the understanding of musical 
absorption as the coming to prominence of the sense of being led can account for its genesis: the music 
imposes a will on the musician, but the response is not merely my response. By “my response”, we mean a 
response of predicting or choosing. Rather, the response to the will of the music, it is the response of a pre-
personal, autonomous, and automatic bodyxx that reacts to the musical commands rather than merely to 
my ideas and intentions. I register that a body transcending my controlxxi performs the music and I develop 
an experiential perspective from which I simply can enjoy seeing this music-body interaction. I can sit 
“down behind the mixer” or fly out to look at the performance as a “large landscape” wishing not to 
interfere but let “everything be there and contribute”. 
Let us offer one final example of the phenomenology of intense musical absorption. On rare occasions 
musicians seem to lose themselves into this web of external force and enter into a conscious state, 
experienced in an overpowering absence of mental faculties also marked by a posterior absence of 
memory. DSQ cellist Fredrik Sjölin expresses it thus: 
The deeper you are in, the less you observe the world around you…and I had this especially 
powerful experience…where I completely disappeared. I remember that it was an incredibly 
pleasant feeling in the body. And it was incredibly strange to come back and at that point I spent a 
few seconds to realize where I had been. I had been completely gone and with no possibility of 
observing…It was this intense euphoric joy. 
Fredrik is neither looking at himself from the outside, nor perceiving the commands of the music nor 
watching his fingers respond. He has left the scene entirely and moved to a rather impenetrable, perhaps 
sleeplike dimension of consciousness. All that is recalled, is the emotion of joy and a pleasant bodily 
sensation. Although rare, mind states identical or similar to this are consistently reported as a fond musical 
memory and even as a raison d’être for some musicians.xxii 
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2. The phenomenology of passivity 
 
It now remains to be demonstrated how the Husserlian notion of “passive synthesis” is a particularly 
important dimension of the experiences presented. Our claim is that they can be understood as a coming 
to the fore of this passive dimension of consciousness that is normally in the background. This claim is 
parallel to that of Legrand, who argues that dancers develop a specialized “performative body”xxiii 
consisting in a coming the fore of a bodily, pre-reflective self-consciousness. We believe that the analysis of 
passivity in relation to aesthetic experience can make headway in understanding the sense of being 
overwhelmed and overpowered by an artwork or the sense in which the music can unfold “on its own” and 
the sense of subject-object blurring for instance experienced by Fredrik when he “completely disappears”. 
It is difficult to get a concrete and lucid grip on passive synthesis. Husserl’s writing on the theme is 
scattered across several different volumes such as Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis, Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, and Experience and Judgment, 
which do not necessarily share a positive definition. A number of commentators have worked on the 
idea,xxiv and we rely on them as their expositions are more focused, and quite frankly clearer, than Husserl’s 
own. For our purposes, we suggest an all-encompassing negative definition, rendering passive synthesis as 
a dimension of consciousness that unfolds without egoic consciousness, that is, without processes of 
predicting, choosing, attending and willing. Steinbock calls it a “primordial regularity of sense-genesis in 
which the ego does not participate” that “characterizes a pre-reflective dimension of experience of 
pregivenness of object-like formations, a dimension that is founding for activity.”xxv Another important 
characterization comes from Biceaga, who calls it a negotiator “between ownness and alterity”.xxvi From 
Steinbock and Biceaga we understand that passive syntheses or passivityxxvii is a dimension of consciousness 
that founds, or acts as, a meaning-making substratum for active mental cognitions and that regulates the 
distinction between self and other. 
Referring to passive syntheses does not mean that the subject is passive or inert. Think of my simple 
perception of the tree outside my window. I direct my attention to it, but its appearance is not exhaustively 
explained by this attention. Husserls writes that: “We always pay attention to “ features, ” no matter which, 
and while we are considering the thing from the viewpoint of one “ feature, ” at the same time it stands 
intentionally there as endowed with others."xxviii The tree is in the attentive foreground, but, like any figure-
ground constellation, the surroundings or other “features” – these familiar buildings, given from this 
particular angle in this particular light – enclosing it, partly constitute what makes it “this tree”. And 
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emotions of nostalgia and anticipation are likewise activated, as I see its first little spring leaves, reminding 
me of this season of lush growth and of the past springs during which I’ve seen the tree. None of these 
associations are actively or purposively initiated by me, but co-presented as immanent in the perception of 
the tree. Pre-reflective internal time consciousness is another passive synthesis.xxix Looking at the “same” 
tree for a while requires an awareness that the tree I saw five seconds ago is the same as the tree I am 
currently perceiving. But to establish this fact, I need not in a comparative, reflective act, mentally match 
the past tree with the present one. Rather, it is given as enduring in retention, a pre-reflective streaming of 
consciousness stretching from the present into the near past as well in protention stretching from the 
present into the near future. This streaming is a necessary condition of sensible object constitution and 
synthesized passively in the sense that there is nothing I can do to initiate or arrest it (perhaps with the 
exception of killing myself or taking some very potent drug).  As a substratum, passivity is normally in the 
experiential background. It is not something we notice because it is what avails our perceptions and 
cognitions of the world. When I walk down the stairs, my intention to get to the street is in the foreground, 
while the many complex bodily processes that actually get me there remain unnoticed, in the 
background.xxx  
We normally take a stable and rather permanent distinction between self and other for granted. I am 
perfectly aware of the stairs and the street as objects and of myself as the subject moving. I never confound 
them (in non-pathological experience). In aesthetic experience, however, as seen in the cases of seeing 
works of art and of playing music, the boundary between self and other or subject and object seemingly 
becomes more porous or blurry. This is not a new claim but can be found in classical theories of aesthetics 
of, for instance, Benson, Dufrenne, Bullogh, Lipps, and Puffer. We also find significant references to this 
sense of blurring or merging in our interview material. For instance in the Danish National Art Gallery, 
Frederik states that in intense experiences with visual art “the pictures become landscapes one can enter 
into”. He feels that he becomes a part of the world of the painting. An even stronger version of merging is 
found in his statement that, in intense experiences with art, “one is dissolved.” In other words, his 
experience is not one where his ego plays a part, but where the work of art becomes who he is. Similarly, 
Lise describes that at the Van Gogh museum in Amsterdam, “everything else is left behind. You are simply 
just in that exhibit or the world, almost as it is.” And Siv relates that “you disappear in it [the work of art].” 
She also describes how she feels that she is in the picture and takes on its perspective: She perceives the 
same horizon with sky and water as she imagines the birds in the picture to experience.xxxi  
Our empirical material, together with the abovementioned classical aestheticians, demonstrate subject-
object blurring or merging to be a phenomenon central to aesthetic experience. The Husserlian framework 
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of passivity, however, offers to clarify our understanding of this unusual phenomenon by accounting for its 
conditions of possibility. One of the ways it does this, is through the idea of anonymity. An excellent 
commentator on Husserlian passivity, Anne Montavont writes: 
The passive intention is certainly an intentional form, but it is an ‘inauthentic’ intentionality 
insofar as it does not yet mobilize an I…The passive intention, insofar as it does not arise from the 
I, insofar as it is not accomplished by the I, insofar as it is an event ‘without’ I, presents itself as an 
objective event that unfolds by itself.xxxii  
As Zahavi writes, passive syntheses are not accomplished by an I, but nevertheless occur to oneself,xxxiii 
which is similar to Husserl’s claim that passive synthesis is: “a proper field of nexuses, ones which run out 
by themselves as objective events, though they are subjectively produced.”xxxiv On an experiential level, the 
intentionality of passivity as “objective events that run out by themselves”, but nevertheless occur to 
oneself or is “subjectively produced” is accompanied by a sense of anonymity, which in some cases can be 
experienced as an unusual distance to oneself or one’s own body. Here we find the connection back to the 
empirical examples of musical absorption. Remember that Frederik Øland and Asbjørn Nørgaard from the 
DSQ experience seeing themselves from the outside, not wishing to “interfere”. They experience that it is 
not primarily them playing, but that playing is something happening to them. The playing is not 
experienced as executed by “me”, but it is also not pathologically disembodied as if someone else was 
doing the playing. Rather, it unfolds in an anonymous way. 
When passivity is expressed in the experiential foreground, it manifests, for instance, in a sense of 
anonymity, the sense that something is happening in me or to me, that transcends my immediate will or 
sense of agency.xxxv Anonymous experience involves what we might call a rarefied sense of self, exactly 
because it leads me to having experiences of which I do not perceive myself as initiator. Ordinary self-
experience consists in a double-edged me as initiator and as recipient, identical to what Gallagher calls the 
sense of agency and the sense of ownership.xxxvi In contrast, what happens when passivity comes to the 
fore is that the me as initiator is anonymized or emptied.xxxvii When otherwise external objects fill this 
empty slot, it gives rise to the experiential sense of fusion. We could imagine the DSQ musicians expressing 
the following scale of increasingly passive experience: “I am playing the music”, “the body is playing the 
music” or “the music is playing me”. The three utterances equally instantiate me as the owner or undergoer 
of the experience, but when it comes to me as initiator they work at three different levels of increasing 
rarefaction. In the first case, I, the willing and choosing ego, holds the place as initiator. In the second case, 
passivity starts to manifest more strongly and the initiator becomes a body which transcends my 
immediate will. In the third case, there is something not merely anonymous, but experienced more 
specifically as other,xxxviii namely the music (sometimes even experienced as the composer), which takes the 
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place as initiator. It follows from this that the experiential dimension of an enlarged, distributed or 
extended sense of self is proportional to its degree of rarefaction. The more rarefied, the more worldly 
objects can be incorporated into the performing subject. It starts with the violin, but can end in dreamlike 
disoriented state in which everything blurs, like Fredrik Sjölin’s experience of “disappearing”. While this 
process of anonymization could be described as a gradual loss of agency, it could just as well be described 
as an expansion of agency going from a somewhat isolated “me” composed of my choices and predictions, 
to a systemic and open agency consisting of my particular habits, dispositions and skills in open exchange 
with the qualities of this instrument, this music, these co-performers, in this room at this time.xxxix  
In the aesthetic experience in art museums, we see a similar kind of passivity at play. When Siv is struck by 
a sculpture like a “bolt from the blue” she is overwhelmed and surprised because something unexpected, 
something of which she is not the initiator, happens to her. The sculpture activates feelings or memories in 
her that she did not evoke herself, and we thus find the sense of passivity through which she intensively 
senses owning an experience which does not coincide with an initiation on her part. In line with Husserl, we 
find that certain activations of the body and of one’s emotionsxl  can powerfully boost the experienced 
sense of passivity. After being led to tears, Siv moves away from the Hepworth sculpture and thus regulates 
and takes charge of her emotional life.  
We are not claiming that emotions are inherently passive.xli Rather, we are simply pointing out that a 
language of passivity, in the Husserlian sense, of “something happening to you” is better at accounting for 
aesthetic experience, than a language of activity, of “intending” or “willing for something to happen”. 
Further limitations to the term, passivity, should be mentioned. Especially in the case of the DSQ members, 
it is problematic to claim that while performing, they are passive as if not involved in the performance at 
all. It should be clear that passivity in this case is a technical Husserlian term denoting the unfolding of 
consciousness without egoic initiation. Also, the term is prone to the intuition that the passive must be 
opposed to the active, but this would misrepresent Husserl who considers them on a continuum.xlii As 
mentioned, there is a rich body of texts from Husserl addressing passive syntheses that, as we have shown, 
can be used to interpret aesthetic experience. In other words, here is a new application and untapped 
phenomenological resource for understanding aesthetic experience, which should be of interest and value 
to researchers of aesthetics and phenomenology alike.  
3. Enactive aesthetics  
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Another phenomenologically inspired, recent take on aesthetics can be found in enactivism or enactive 
aesthetics.xliii The authors defending this position, however, go about it in a way that seems to contradict 
our Husserlian presentation, as they stress the inherently active nature of perception and cognition in 
aesthetic experience. Malafouris for instance regrets that theories of aesthetics often fail to pay “proper 
attention to the constructive process and materiality of aesthetic creation as a form of action”. “As a 
consequence aesthetics very often looks more like a ‘happening’ than a ‘doing’; something suffered or 
undergone by a ‘patient’ rather than actively engaged in.”xliv In the following analysis of Krueger’s work, we 
will show that this enactive criticism does not contradict our Husserlian analysis. If it did it would be 
problematic, generally because it could expose our position as faulty, but also specifically because 
enactivism derives much of its philosophical baggage from phenomenology and moreover purports to 
faithfully describe lived experience, with its insistence on “a deep continuity between mind and life”.xlv It 
would be unfortunate that two positions claiming the same philosophical inheritance contradict one 
another on a matter as important as aesthetic experience. Enactivism is a line of thinking within the “4E 
cognition” (embodied, embedded, enacted, extended) wave roughly beginning in the 1980s. It covers a 
number of different but related positions and lines of argumentation that we will not cover in any detail 
here.xlvi Rather, we will go straight to Krueger’s analyses of music perception as an example of enactive 
aesthetics and supply with some background enactive theory, where it clarifies his position. Krueger has 
devoted several publications to an account of enactive music perception and analyzes examples of being on 
one’s own listening to music and of being in an audience attending a concert.xlvii  
Imagine going to a large concert hall to indulge in your favorite Beethoven symphony. It would seem that 
you are going with the purpose of being swept away by the magnificent soundscape of the huge symphony 
orchestra, with the intention to listen and concentrate on the music, to let your mind be transported to 
dreamlike, imaginary, beautiful scenarios and to have an uplifting and intense emotional experience. Yet, 
Krueger argues that this is a case of active “doing” rather than passive “undergoing”:xlviii “Musician and 
audience are mutually implicated as co-performers and musician, audience, and situation all are in this way 
part of the enactive dynamic of the music-event, and play a role in determining the content of the 
perceiver’s experience in that context.”xlix Steinhardt from the famous Guaneri String Quartet, can be taken 
to support Krueger’s analysis, writing that it makes a huge difference whether you are performing for 
someone or not.l Even if the score is set and the interpretation fixed, the music as a whole is determined by 
moods, memories, and emotions of the musicians, which in turn are shaped by such things as the 
atmosphere, air, temperature, smell and sound reverberation. Furthermore, at a more intrusive end of the 
scale, audiences sometimes snore, cough, sneeze, trip and yell or fail to keep their mobiles on silent mode. 
Even if the main agents of a concert are the musicians, if we are to account for the unfolding music in its 
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experienced totality, we must include the role of the audience into the primary unit of analysis. The concert 
hall, the audience, microphones and musicians together enact one single system that is dynamically 
coupled such that changes in one end induces further change in the whole system. In other words, the 
seemingly passive spectators actually play an active role in shaping the experience of the music as heard.  
In the theoretical background of Krueger’s proposal, we find the enactive thinking of autopoeitic, dynamic 
systems: According to Thompson,li our experience is enacted, or brought forth in dynamic systemic 
interactions between agents and their environments. We are elements in a coupled system, in which the 
slightest perturbation in one end reverberates through the entire system. A dynamic system consists 
primarily of two mutually constraining features. Autopoeisis, or the self-production and self-maintenance 
of the “autonomous” and “self individuating” part of the system,lii in our case the musician or the particular 
person in the audience. And the overall sense-making or dynamic of the system considered as a whole, in 
which the parts are embedded. The parts relate to one another, but under the normative constraints of the 
system, which they also co-constitute: “An autopoietic system is like a homeostatic system, whereby the 
homeostatic variable is its own organization.”liii In addition to the agency of the individual parts, the system 
as such possesses agency and determination over its constituent parts.liv In the normative space of the 
concert hall, the spectators are coupled to the musicians and co-determine the overall experience of the 
outcome of the whole system, namely the music performance. Let us withhold the comparative analysis of 
how this active role of the audience can be interpreted as a Husserlian passivity and instead turn to another 
example of Krueger’s in which the “spectator” perform a putatively entirely passive role relative to the 
musical experience.   
 
In another paper, Krueger turns to the experience of listening to music, not in a concert-hall, but through 
one’s headphones or at home through one’s speakers. How do we understand such a situation, enactively? 
It [the music] is an external resource that allows us to cultivate, refine, and explore familiar 
emotional experiences in new ways—or even develop emotional experiences we may not 
otherwise have. My thesis…is that it does so by integrating with, and subsequently enhancing, the 
functional complexity of various endogenous processes responsible for generating and sustaining 
emotional experience. In some instances, we use the music as an emotion extending tool. We 
offload some of the regulatory and emotional work onto the music – much the way we offload 
part of the remembering process onto our social and material environments – and music becomes 
part of the physical vehicle needed to access certain emotional experiences.lv  
 
We are not passive recipients in listening to music on our own; we actively use it for emotion regulation. 
To justify this claim, Krueger relies on work in the sociology of music, notably Tia DeNora’s work on Music in 
Everyday Life. DeNora gives examples from everyday life where people use music to regulate their 
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emotions: A woman uses Verdi’s requiem in a process of grieving, shuts herself in a room, listening as a 
form of catharsis.lvi We can accept this claim, but still maintain that the listening on its own is a passive act 
of reception. That listening can be actively used for emotion regulation, does not entail that the perceptual 
act considered on its own is active. Rather, it merely entails that we make a certain active use of it. In other 
words, we can distinguish between the phenomenological character of a certain experience and the 
response to, or context in which we undergo that experience. We saw this earlier in Siv’s case of being led 
to tears by the Hepworth sculpture (the immediate phenomenological character of the experience) and her 
retracting from the sculpture to return to it later (her response to that initial experience). But Krueger 
advances an even stronger argument in favour of the inherently active contribution of the listener, not 
merely as a response of contextual shaping, but as pertaining to the very phenomenological character of 
aesthetic experience. He coins the term “deep listening”, which is an “experience of listening attentively 
and selectively to a work, engaging with it carefully and opening oneself up to the possibility of being 
absorbed by the music.lvii Deep listening is “a mode of active perception: an exploration, manipulation, and 
drawing out of selected emotive properties via our sensorimotor engagement with the music”lviii because 
this form of listening literally requires a spatial and bodily-based inhabitation of the musical structure. This 
becomes evident when such inhabitation is lacking, for instance in the case of amusia, the inability to 
recognize tempo and pitch in music.lix Krueger refers to studies showing that: “amusia is linked not to a 
specific sensory-musical deficit but rather to a spatial deficit—an inability to represent space” and that: 
“amusiacs were found to perform significantly worse than non-amusiac control subjects on mental rotation 
tasks.”lx From these studies, he makes the following phenomenological interpretation: 
 
it seems that amusiacs are unable…to perceive music as having the sort of spatially inviting 
structure that might be experientially inhabited—and music thus remains an alien and 
impenetrable entity.lxi  
 
“Amusia is thus an inability to perceive and respond to the sensorimotor contingencies afforded by inner 
space of musical pieces”,lxii which in turn implies that to listen attentively to music is to spatially engage and 
make sense of the musical landscape. To listen to music as music and not as noise rests on the active 
contribution of a sense-making, exploratory intentionality, which together with the played music enacts the 
total meaningful, musical experience. 
 
To understand this proposal, we need to understand what a “sensorimotor engagement with the music” 
is.lxiii Here, we turn to Noë’s famous dictum that perception is not something we undergo, but something 
we do.lxiv This claim builds on his studies of the nature of perception, coupled with the phenomenological 
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idea of the embodiment of subjectivity and Gibson’s ecological psychology of affordances. The tradition, 
like autopoeitic enactivism, has been developed as a response to a naturalistic, cognitivist conception of 
perception, which it believes has difficulty accounting for a number of perceptual phenomena.lxv An 
example is what Husserl calls “appresentation”,lxvi the fact that although we do not see the reverse side of 
objects, they are somehow co-presented in perception. Rather than seeing a world of only front sides, we 
perceive a practical world with whole, graspable objects that appeal to us in various ways. In other words, 
we visually perceive much more than we see. From this fact of perception, Noë develops the term 
“sensorimotor contingencies” or “sensorimotor dependencies”:lxvii The constitution of your body and the 
ways you can move determine what you can see. Perception is not like a camera, passively receiving 
reflected light into its receptor. It is an embodied explorative activity of reaching out for what is salient and 
interesting in one’s environment. This is what it means for perception to be enacted. When listening to 
recorded music, unlike the previous example from the concert-hall, one cannot causally impact the 
unfolding of the music. The recording is a completely closed and self-contained system. But Krueger’s point 
is in order to hear it as music and not noise, I need to employ my sensory-motor abilities and pick out the 
relevant features of the recording. And, even if the recording is a closed system, I can manipulate what I 
hear, by exploring or attending to yet other features. 
4. Activity and passivity 
 
Krueger’s enactive view construes aesthetic experience as inherently active. Even the seemingly most 
passive action, namely listening to music on a stereo or through one’s headphones necessarily involves an 
active meaning-making contribution from the listener. By contrast, our phenomenologically interpreted 
empirical material shows that aesthetic experience, even in its seemingly most active form, namely that of 
performing music, centrally revolves around a fundamental receptive and anonymous sense of passivity. 
How do we account for this seeming contradiction? Let us take a closer look at the notions of passivity 
employed in the two traditions.  On what background does enactivism advance its thesis of the activity of 
aesthetic experience? As described, the thesis derives from the overall research paradigm of sensory-motor 
contingencies and dynamic systems, developed as a challenge to orthodox cognitivist theories: “Enactivism 
explicitly rejects traditional cognitivist notions of mental representations and the passive computational 
input–output conceptions of cognitive processing so prevalent in cognitive science.”lxviii The principle of 
activity in enactivism is specifically meant to oppose a notion of passivity as “passive computational input–
output conceptions”. The input-output conception of the relation between self and world is static: external 
sense data stimulates my cognitive apparatus, through the requisite sensory channels, is processed and 
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lead to some motor reaction. The enactivist objection to this conception, directly influenced by Merleau-
Pontylxix is to show how self and world are always already intertwined and how a static conception of 
interior and exterior is erroneous. This intertwinement is echoed in Thompson’s work on dynamic systems 
in which subjectivity as a whole is enacted, or brought forth in the interaction between the organism and 
the world around it. As he puts it, the activity of “sense-making…is the living source of intentionality”.lxx 
Subjectivity and agential activity are not situated inside the head, but are created in the relation between 
brain, body and world. When applied to the realm of aesthetics, this is not an inaccurate description of the 
way seeing art activates dormant feelings and memories. When sufficiently open to aesthetic experience, 
the work of art and the self becomes a sort of dynamic field where emotions, thoughts, memories and 
hopes are activated, brought forth, or enacted by the system of spectator-artwork-museum.  
Husserlian passivity is not equivalent to the passivity in cognitive science against which enactivism reacts. 
Rather, it helps to found that very criticism by laying bare the conditions of possibility of intertwinement of 
self and world, qua passivity as negotiator of “ownness and alterity”.lxxi Husserlian passivity does not 
construe bodily perceptual systems as passive receptacles of stimuli. It rather delineates a dynamic 
substratum of affective and bodily dimensions of subjectivity that underlies and integrates perception into 
meaningful wholes, as exemplified with the simple perception of a tree outside my window. To distinguish 
Husserlian passivity from that of orthodox representationalist cognitive science, we from now on label the 
former “generative passivity”. At this point, the argument thus shows us that enactive activity and 
generative passivity are compatible: there is an entire dimension of subjectivity, normally hidden from 
sight,lxxii which is exactly not accomplished or initiated by me. Passivity as one single dynamic continuum 
that can encompass objects (the music or the violin as playing me) my body with its anonymous dimension, 
and the sense of myself as the subject to whom this continuum unfolds, is compatible with enactment. 
Neither of them construct impermeable boundaries between self and world, but rather highlight the 
dynamic meaning-making or sense-making activity binding us into the world and providing the “soil upon 
which the free activity of the ego moves”.lxxiii Let us return to Krueger to finish the argument. 
Krueger argues that the cause of amusia is not an impairment to auditory perception, but rather, that 
amusiacs fail to construct the requisite mental space necessary to perceive the music as a homogeneous 
whole. The consequence for normal music listeners, is that even if passively listening, they are actively 
constructing this meaning-making musical space as a sense-making activity. But whereas Krueger’s idea 
renders this meaning-making an activity, the Husserlian will clearly recognize it as an act of passive 
synthesis. Who exactly is constructing the meaning-making musical space? It is certainly not something I as 
listener do actively; it is not an activity of my will. Rather, I am occupied with listening to the music. The 
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underlying space is anonymously constructed and “unfolds by itself”,lxxiv its construction is something 
happening to me. There is nothing I can do to unconstruct this space, once acquired. Surely, I could in an 
egoic act choose to focus my attention on other elements than the melody or the musical whole, say on the 
bass line, the harmonic progression or on the meter, and thus construct the musical landscape differently, 
but that presupposes in the first place, that I am able to perceive the music as music, in other words, that I 
have a thoroughly engrained and passively constructed habit of listening to this kind of music. We all know 
this, when becoming acquainted with a musical culture for the first time, be it a Bach Sonata, a movement 
from Shönberg, an Indian Raga, or song from speed or progressive metal. In the first instance, you mostly 
hear noise or sounds and cannot perceive or understand the structure and unfolding of the piece. But little 
by little, you build a habit and make sense of the piece and only then can you move on to deep listening 
“probing and exploring a piece to unearth new qualities and textures.”lxxv What’s more, for passive habit 
synthesis, I need internal time consciousness to bind the just-past (retention), the present (primal 
impression), and the anticipated (protension) into the meaningful whole that we call a melody. Husserl’s 
example par excellence of internal time-consciousnesslxxvi  – one of the passive syntheses – is none other 
than the melody. The contexts of listening to music, seeing art, but also of performing music are often 
accompanied by changes in the sense of time flowing, for instance as slowing down or perhaps not passing 
at all. This sense of a change in time flow, then, is an example of a certain activation and coming to the 
experiential fore of passive synthesis. In other words, the exercise of habits and internal time 
consciousness, necessary for a certain construction of musical space, are prime examples of passive 
synthesis.lxxvii To Krueger, the amusiac, as an example of deficiency, points to a layer of activity involved 
even in the seemingly most passive activity and thus demonstrates the enactive thesis. To the Husserlian, 
however, it is a case of passive synthesis, providing objects as meaningfully perceived.  
5. Conclusion  
 
We started the section on Krueger’s account asking whether enactive aesthetics contradict our Husserlian 
take, given that he stresses listening to music primarily as a kind of “doing” rather than mere “undergoing”. 
But we have found that the two accounts are in fact compatible. Krueger would probably agree with this, as 
he also mentions the experience of “letting go” associated with “deep listening”. He writes that these are: 
“heightened experiences of music listening in which we feel as though we are experientially consumed by, 
and somehow taken up into, the music… Within these experiences, we become acutely aware of the way 
that “musical agency” (Fritz et al., 2013) profoundly augments, extends, and organizes our own affective 
resources.”lxxviii Being “consumed by and somehow taken up into” is clearly reminiscent of Siv’s aesthetic 
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experience of “disappearing” or “being in” the work of art and the notion of musical agency has likewise 
been central to our understanding of the DSQ’s phenomenology of absorption. In autopoeitic enactive 
technical terms we may thus interpret the experience of being overwhelmed and consumed by the work of 
art or fused with it as a situation where the balance between the “self-individuating” parts of the system 
and its overall dynamic coupling is momentarily pushed toward the latter, with a weaker sense of self-
preservation in favor of a greater sense of coupling. 
We welcome the attempt to balance the inherently passive dimension of aesthetic experience with the 
active mental contribution that the enactive perspective highlights and which we in the Husserlian context 
have called “generative” and we urge enactivists to give it prominence in future accounts, so as to live up to 
their intended “deep continuity of mind and life”.lxxix Ultimately, our aim is not to reduce incredible 
complex aesthetic experiences to pure passivity. Roald’s concept “intrapellation”, Dufrenne’s “feeling” and 
Bertram’s “dependence in independence”lxxx all point to the intricate relation between activity and 
receptivity in aesthetic experience. In this article we have simply highlighted the passive dimension in 
aesthetic experience and elucidated that the experience of “letting go” or becoming absorbed is complex, 
multilayered and calls for further analysis. We have shown that passivity is essential and that in the realm 
of aesthetics, being overwhelmed, struck or surprised means undergoing an experience that one did not 
initiate, it means that the passive basis of the experience is phenomenally heightened. 
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